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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT
The federal estate tax' is not a tax on property or on the right to receive
property from a decedent; rather it is a tax on the privilege of transferring
property from the dead to the living.2 Inordinate as it might appear, due
to it being a federal levy, its principal effect is directed only upon reason-
ably large estates, because the tax is levied upon a taxable estate over
$60,000.3 Since payment of the estate tax must necessarily reduce the size
of the estate available for distribution or diminish the recipient's share of
the decedent's property, it is important to determine where the ultimate
tax burden is to be placed.
Placement of the tax burden can be made by one of three possible
procedures. First, the burden may be borne by the residuary estate. 4 The
effect of this "burden on the residue" doctrine is to give all specific recip-
ients their full respective shares without deduction, and to charge the
general beneficiaries the total amount of the tax. Another procedure,
referred to as the "equitable apportionment" doctrine, places the impact
of the tax upon each and every recipient of the decedent's property in
proportion to his benefits.5 The third procedure is a compromise between
the first two and places the burden both on the residuary beneficiaries
under the will and on those taking interests outside the will, the non-
probate interests.6 By including the non-probate assets, those which pass
and vest by gift and contract law and not by will, in the tax apportion-
ment, specific legatees and devisees are granted their full interest and the
residuary beneficiaries and the recipients of the non-probate assets are
required to pay a proportional share of the tax imposition.
The reason behind the apportionment doctrine is best understood when
it is realized that for the purpose of determining the amount of the tax
imposition the taxable estate includes not only real and personal property
passing under a will or by laws of descent and distribution, but also many
non-probate assets. These interests include: (1) gifts made in contem-
plation of death; (2) inter vivos trusts intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after death; (3) life trusts subject to revocation; (4)
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § S 2001-2209.
2 Lawless v. Lawless, 17 111. App. 2d 481, 150 N.E.2d 646 (1958).
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2052. Another $60,000 may be deductible by virtue of the
marital deduction as provided in S 2056, plus deductibles allowed for transfers to
charities. Thus estates up to $120,000 are generally considered to be tax free.
4 Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 NE. 265 (1919).
5 In re Mellon's Estate, 347 Pa. 520, 32 A.2d 749 (1943).
6 In re Gato's Estate, 276 App. Div. 651, 97 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1950), aff'd, 301 N.Y. 653,
93 N.E.2d 294 (applying Florida law); In re Gallagher's Will, 57 N.M. 112, 255 P.2d
317 (1953).
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life insurance proceeds; (5) joint tenancy property, which may be stocks,
bonds, bank accounts and the family home; (6) powers of appointment;
and others.7 Therefore, with non-probate assets and specific devises and
bequests being included with the residuary estate in the determination of
the amount of the tax, if the residuary estate alone had to bear the tax
burden it becomes feasible to visualize many situations where the relation-
ship of the former could be so unproportional to the latter as to cause
its total depletion. This inequality must also be viewed in regard to the
normal practice of testators bequeathing the residue of the estate to spouse,
issue or relative.
This comment will consider the placement of the ultimate tax burden
and the participation therein of non-residuary beneficiaries. The impor-
tance of participation is of immediate monetary concern to all distributees
of a decedent's property and has significance to a testator in the planning
of his estate," because he has the right to shift the tax burden from where
the law would locate it by the use of appropriately clear language in his
will.9 This right, recognized in the federal estate tax statute, 10 necessitates
knowledge of which procedure, apportionment or burden on the residue,
will be applied in the event the testator's will contains no tax provision.
Confusion surrounding the applicable law has led to numerous cases in-
volving judicial construction of tax provisions in wills."
Placement of the ultimate tax burden is not related to its payment, only
to the liability for payment. The executor or administrator of an estate12
is charged by statute with the actual payment of the entire federal estate
taxia regardless of the fact that the gross estate consists of non-probate
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, S§ 2031-2044.
8 Where an intestate leaves no property which can pass except under the laws of
descent and distribution, no problem of placement exists. The tax is deducted before
the computation of the intestate shares. See Hampton's Administrator v. Hampton,
188 Ky. 199, 221 S.W. 496 (1920); Martin v. Martin's Administrator, 283 Ky. 513, 142
S.W.2d 164 (1940).
9 United States Trust Co. v. Sears. 29 F.Supp. 643 (D.C. Conn. 1939); In re Wal-
bridge's Estate, 170 Misc. 127, 9 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1939); "It is considered competent for
a testator to specify what property shall assume the burden of inheritance tax on the
transfer or right of succession of his estate." In re McDonald's Estate, 314 Ill. App. 148,
150, 41 N.E.2d 128, 130 (1942); U.S. v. Goodson, 253 F.2d 900 (8th Cir. 1958), recog-
nizing the right of testator to shift the burden of the federal estate tax.
10 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2205.
11 See generally, 37 A.L.R.2d 7 (1954), for a collection of cases concerning will provi-
sions affecting tax burdens. The cases are too numerous and the possibilities too great
to be included within the scope of this paper.
12 The definition of "executor" for purposes of the estate tax includes an administra-
tor. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2203. This procedure is adopted in this paper.
13 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, S 2002.
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assets, which do not come within his possession. 14 This duty is placed
upon the executor only to facilitate the government's collection of the
tax and the ultimate burden is determined by state law.'5 The executor,
in order to make payment, must use the funds of the estate available to
him. Whether the executor has a right' to seek reimbursement on behalf
of the residue estate from the recipients of special devises and non-probate
interest is the issue of equitable apportionment. The answer to this ques-
tion will then determine the placement of the ultimate tax burden.
The federal estate tax as first enacted 16 made no attempt at locating the
ultimate burden of the tax, though it did make the executor of the estate
responsible for its payment.17 After enactment, a provision was added
whereby the executor was entitled to collect a proportionate share of the
tax from the beneficiary of any insurance proceeds which were included
in the decedent's gross estate, unless the decedent's will provided to the
contrary.'8 The effect of this provision was to apportion the tax against
non-probate assets consisting of insurance proceeds. In 1942, another pro-
vision was added to allow apportionment where the non-probate assets
consisted of property subject to a power of appointment.'9 Even before
the inclusion of the latter provision some states were allowing apportion-
ment of the estate tax where appointive property was involved.20 No
other apportionment provisions have been added to the federal statute to
supplement these two non-probate asset directives. Although payment of
the tax by the executor was still required, the placement of the ultimate
tax burden was not specified.
Early case determination of the apportionment issue was resolved in
favor of placing the tax burden on the residuary estate. Support for these
holdings was based on various state court interpretations of the federal
statute. One supporting proposition argued that inasmuch as the executor
was required to pay the tax before distribution of the estate it was a
parallel to the required payment of debts, charges and just obligations
from the residuary estate; therefore, the tax also was an obligation of the
14 Treas. Reg., S 20.2002-1.
15 Seattle First National Bank v. Macomber, 32 Wash. 2d 696, 203 P.2d 1078 (1949);
Carpenter v. Carpenter, 364 Mo. 782, 267 S.W.2d 632 (1954).
'6 Revenue Act of 1916, S 200, 89 Stat. 77.
17 Supra note 13.
18 Revenue Act of 1918, 5 480, 40 Stat. 1057. This section was the basis for S 2206 of
the Ir. REv. CODE OF 1954.
19 Revenue Act of 1942, S 403 (c). This section was the basis for S 2207 of the INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954.
2O Regents of University System v. Trust Company of Georgia, 194 Ga. 225, 21 S.E.2d
691 (1942); Hooker v. Drayton, 69 R.I. 290, 33 A.2d 206 (1943). Cf. First National
Bank v. Hart, 393 111.489, 50 N.E.2d 461 (1943). See generally, 150 A.L.R. 723 (1944).
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estate to be paid from the residuary.21 Another interpretation was predi-
cated upon federal preemption of the area because, since Congress had
authorized apportionment in certain situations, no other apportionment was
intended. 22 Furthermore, it was argued that where specific devises and
bequests were made by a testator who also made a gift of the estate resi-
due, he manifested an intention to have the tax burden fall on the residue.28
Not only did the early cases rule against apportionment where devised
and bequeathed property was involved,24 but they did so where the tax-
able estate included non-probate assets, other than life insurance proceeds
and appointive property.2 5 The only case which appears to have upheld
apportionment was a 1918 New Hampshire case20 involving specific and
residuary legacies. This case appears to be the first to decide the question
of the placement of the federal estate tax burden. However, the case was
overruled in 193827 and thereafter, New Hampshire temporarily applied
the "burden on the residue" doctrine.28
The aforementioned foundations for state application of the "burden
on the residue" doctrine, with the exception of a testator's presumed in-
tention in the absence of a tax provision in his will,29 ceased to exist in
1942 when the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Riggs
v. Del Drago.30 The court held that final determination of the ultimate
burden of the federal estate tax was up to the individual states, except
where Congress had specifically provided to the contrary.
The Del Drago case involved a New York decedent who by will made
certain outright bequests to one legatee, created a life trust with a re-
mainder over in others, and left the residuary estate in a life trust to the
first mentioned legatee with a remainder over. No provision was made in
the will regarding payment of taxes. When the executor sought to have
21 Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471,124 N.E. 265 (1919); Hepburn v.
Winthrop, 65 App. D.C. 309, 83 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
22 Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 140 N.E. 686 (1923); Farmers Loan Co. v.
Winthrop, 238 N.Y. 488, 144 N.E. 769 (1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 633 (1925).
28 Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.. 114 (1922), aff'd, 264 U.S. 47 (1924).
24 Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., supra note 21; In re Hamlin 266 N.Y. 407, 124
N.. 4, cert. denied, 250 U.S. 672 (1919); Y.M.CA. v. Davis, supra note 23.
25 Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Co. v. Older, 50 Cal. App. 2d 724, 123 P.2d
873 (1942); Ericson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, 198 Ad. 176 (1938); Farmers Loan and
Trust Co. v. Winthrop, supra note 22; see generally, 37 A.L.R.2d 169, 184 (1954).
2 6 Fuller v. Gale, 78 N.H. 544, 103 At. 308 (1918).
27 Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 89 N.H. 471, 200 Ad. 786
(1938).
28 In 1942 the New Hampshire legislature adopted an apportionment statute, N.H.
REV. STAT. ch. 88 (1942).
2 9 Supra note 23. 80 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
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the federal estate tax apportioned among all the persons beneficially inter-
ested in the estate pursuant to a New York Statute providing for such
apportionment, 81 the life tenants and outright legatee raised objection as
to the constitutionality of the apportionment statute. The court-appointed
guardian for the infant remainderman under the residuary trust contended
that the tax had to be apportioned in accordance with the statute. In
holding that the New York statute did not contravene the Federal Consti-
tution's supremacy clause since it was not in conflict with the federal
estate tax law, Mr. Justice Murphy said in delivering the opinion of the
court:
WAe are of the opinion that Congress intended that the federal estate tax
should be paid out of the estate as a whole and that the applicable state law
as to the devolution of property at death should govern the distribution of
the remainder and the ultimate impact of the federal tax. .... 32
The following year, this position was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
in Harrison v. The Northern Trust Company.88
The New York statute upheld in Del Drago was the first attempt by a
state legislature 4 to overcome the inequities of the burden on the residue
application. The statute applied to both federal and state estate tax and
provided for apportionment to both probate and non-probate assets.8 5
But because case law in other states was based in part on federal pre-
emption in the field,38 the respective legislatures did not follow New
York's lead until Del Drago affirmed the validity of a state's authority to
determine the placement of the tax burden. A study made by the author
of the statutory enactments in the various states reveals that there are
twenty-three states which today have statutes concerning apportionment.
Two states, Alabama and Iowa, specifically provide against apportionment
and place the burden of the tax on the residue of the estate. 7 Florida,
Massachusetts and New Jersey require apportionment in regard to non-
probate interests only.38 The other eighteen statutory states provide for
apportionment among all parties interested in the decedent's property,
31 NEw YORK DECEDENT'S ESTATE LAW, S 124.
82 Supra note 30, at 96-7.
38 317 U.S. 476 (1942).
84 Supra note 31; originally enacted by NEW YORK LAWS ch. 790 (1930).
8 5 Ibid.
36 Supra note 22.
87 CODE OF ALABAMA tit. 51, 5 449(1) (Supp. 1965); IOWA LAWS 1963, ch. 326, § 449.
88 FLA. STAT. 1965, § 734.041. Florida had a total apportionment statute in 1949 but
repealed it and enacted a no apportionment statute in 1957. The present statute was
adopted in 1963; MASS. GEN. LAWS 1932, ch. 65A, §§ 5A-B, as amended by MASS. AcTs
1943, ch. 519, MAss AcTs 1948, ch. 605, § 2; N.J. STAT. SS 3A:25-30 to -38.
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probate and non-probate.8 9 All statutes provide, however, that a testator
has the right to shift the burden of the tax.40 A Uniform Estate Tax
Apportionment Act was approved and recommended for enactment in all
states by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1958.41 The proposed Act contemplated total apportionment and
did not distinguish between probate and non-probate assets.42 The Act
was revised in 1964 to provide for apportionment of expenses incurred
in the determination of proration, and to provide for payment out of the
residue of the estate when payment could not be collected from a person
required to pay the tax.48 However, only four states have deemed it ad-
visable to adopt the 1958 Act or the 1964 revision.44 In states which have
no applicable apportionment statute, the court makes the final determina-
tion as to the ultimate estate tax burden, subject to the testator's directives
and the specific intent of Congress. 45 Nine states still require that the
burden be placed on the residue whenever possible.4 6 Of the remaining
89ARK. STAT. ANN. § 63-150 (Supp. 1965); CAL. PROBATE CODE § 970-7, (See In re
Welsh Estate, 89 Cal. 2d 43, 200 P.2d 139 (1948) upholding constitutionality); CONN.
GEN. STAT. S 12-400 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, S 2901-6, (See Wilmington Trust
Co. v. Copeland, 33 Del. 309, 94 A.2d 703 (1953) holding statute to be declaratory of
existing law and applicable retroactively); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:2431-:2438 (Supp. 1965);
MD. LAWS 1965 ch. 907 (Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act, 1964 Revision);
MICH. CoMp. LAWS SS 720.11-.21 (1948) as amended, LAWS 1963, act 144 (Uniform
Estate Tax Apportionment Act), LAWS 1965, act 259; MINN. STAT. 1965 §§ 525.521-.527;
NEB. REV. STAT. 77-2108 to 2112; NEV. REV. STAT. SS 150.290-.390 (Supp. 1965); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 88-A, §§ 1-11 (Supp. 1965), (Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment
Act); N.Y. DECEDENTS ESTATE LAW S 124; OKLA. STAT. ch. 58, §§ 2001-11 (Supp. 1965);
PENN. LAWS 1951 ch. 1405 (Purdon, PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §5 881-7); S.D. LAWS
1961 ch. 196; TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 30, S§ 30-1117 to -1118 (Supp. 1965); CODE OF VA.
S§ 64, 150-51 (Supp. 1965); Wyo. STAT. S 2, 336-46 (Supp. 1965), (Uniform Estate Tax
Apportionment Act).
40 ... the amount of the tax, except in a case where a testator otherwise directs in
his will, ... NEW YORK DECEDENT ESTATE LAW, S 124.
41 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
131, 132, 219, 221 (1958).
42 See generally, Scoles and Stephens, The Proposed Uniform Estate Tax Appor-
tionment Act, 43 MINN. L. REV. 907 (1959).
43 UNIFoRM LAW ANNOTATED, Vol. 9A, p. 494 (1965).
44 Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire and Wyoming, supra note 39.
45 Riggs v. Del Drago, supra note 30.
46 Ramsey v. Nordloh, 143 Col. 526, 354 P.2d 513 (1960); In re Glover's Estate, 45
Haw. 569, 371 P.2d 361 (1962), dower in personalty was held to be probate property
for purposes of apportionment and the question was left open in regard to apportion-
ment of non-probate interests. First National Bank of Chicago v. Hart, 393 Ill. 489,
50 N.E.2d 461 (1943), see discussion of the Illinois problem in this comment, infra;
Central Trust Co. v. Burrow, 144 Kan. 79, 58 P.2d 469 (1936), denying apportionment
to non-probate interests; Buffalo v. Barnes, 226 N.C. 313, 38 S.E.2d 222 (1946); Corn-
well v. Huffman, 258 N.C. 363, 128 S.E.2d 798 (1963); Sinnatt v. Gidney, 159 Tex. 366,
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eighteen states, five recognize total apportionment 47 and eight have re-
quired recipients of non-probate interests to share proportionately in the
burden with the residuary beneficiaries. 48 No cases have been found in
the other five states which would determine the placement of the ultimate
estate tax burden.49
STATUS OF APPORTIONMENT IN ILLINOIS
Illinois does not have a statute apportioning the federal estate tax, there-
fore, subject to a testator's proper directive and to the apportionment
provisions of federal legislation, the placement of the ultimate tax burden
is by judicial determination.50 Although Illinois is generally considered to
be included as a member of those states which invoke the "burden on the
residue" doctrine, 5' an examination of the principal Illinois cases reveals
confusion as to the appropriateness of applying this doctrine. This denial
of apportionment, as will be shown, has often been recited as dictum in
cases bearing no relation to the federal estate tax burden and has been based
on a misunderstanding of the federal estate tax statute. One of the earliest
322 S.W.2d 507 (1959), rejecting apportionment where only probate assets were
involved; Seattle First National Bank v. Macomber, 32 Wash. 2d 696, 203 P.2d 1078
(1949), denying apportionment to non-probate interests; Cuppett v. Neilly, 143 W.Va.
845, 105 S.E.2d 548 (1958), placing burden on residue if sufficient; Guaranty National
Bank v. Mitchill, 144 W.Va. 828, 111 S.E.2d 494 (1959); In re Joas's Estate, 16 Wis. 2d
489, 114 N.W.2d 831 (1962), apportionment denied to non-probate interest.
47 Trimble v. Hatcher's Executors, 295 Ky. 178, 173 S.W.2d 985 (1943) cert. denied,
321 U.S. 747; Gunn v. Sutherland, 311 Ky. 578, 224 S.W.2d 929 (1949); Jones v. Jones,
376 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. 1964); see U.S. v. Traders National Bank of Kansas City, 248 F.2d
667, (8th Cir. 1958) regarding Missouri as applying equitable apportionment; Marans
v. Newland, 143 Mont. 38, 390 P.2d 443 (1964); In re Berzel's Estate, 101 N.W.2d 557
(N.D. 1960); Beatty v. Cake, 236 Ore. 389, 387 P.2d 355 (1963), applied apportionment
to inter vivos transfer, but language of case is to the effect of total apportionment.
48 Doetch v. Doetch, 312 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1963), applying Arizona law; Regents of
University System v. Trust Company of Georgia, 194 Ga. 255, 21 S.E.2d 691 (1942);
apportionment applied to appointive property prior to enactment of Ir. REv. CODE
provision; Pearcy v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co., 121 Ind. App. 136, 96 N.E.2d 918
(1951); Bragdon v. Worthley, 155 Me. 284, 153 A.2d 627 (1959), applied to inter vivos
conveyance, but language of the court that it could apply equitable apportionment
might indicate that they would apply total apportionment (Maine enacted a total ap-
portionment statute in LAWS 1947, ch. 220, but repealed it in LAWS 1949, ch. 349; In re
Gallagher's Will, 57 N.M. 112, 225 P.2d 317 (1953); McDougall v. Central National
Bank of Cleveland, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1953); Campbell v. Lloyd, 162
Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695 (1954); Hooker v. Drayton, 69 R.I. 290, 33 A.2d 286
(1961); Meyer v. Sinkler, 235 S.C. 162, 110 S.E.2d 241 (1959).
49 Alaska, Idaho, Mississippi, Utah, Vermont.
50 Supra note 30.
51 First National Bank of Chicago v. Hart, supra note 46; See also 37 A.L.R.2d, supra
note 25.
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Illinois cases to mention apportionment was People v. Pasfield,52 which
was concerned with the computation of the state inheritance tax. After
determining that the federal estate tax was to be deducted before compu-
tation, the court went on to say:
As the duty [the federal estate tax] is made payable by the executor or ad-
ministrator to the collector or deputy collector by the express provision of
the statute [Revenue Act of 1916], the duty is an expense or a charge against
the estate of the decedent and not an express charge against the shares of
the legatees or distributees of the decedent .... 58
This case, which was decided in 1918, and the cases of People v. The
Northern Trust Company54 and People v. McCormick,55 which were
decided soon thereafter and which were also concerned only with compu-
tation of the state inheritance tax, were decided at a time when many
jurisdictions considered the tax to be paralleled to the payment of debts,
charges and obligations from the residuary, or else considered apportion-
ment to have been pre-empted by the federal estate tax statute.56
The 1943 decision of the Illinois court in First National Bank of Chi-
cago v. Hart57 is the case most often cited as representing the Illinois
application of the "burden on the residue" doctrine and disallowment of
apportionment. This is so even though the case only involved residuary
beneficiaries and no specific recipients of the testator's estate and there-
fore, was not a true tax apportionment case. In Hart, the residuary estate
passed in equal thirds to the two living children of the decedent and to
two grandchildren by way of an appointive trust. Though the assessment
of the total state inheritance tax against the grandchildren was less than
that against the two living children, due to a double exemption and re-
sulting lesser rate of assessment, the executor of the estate charged the
grandchildren's trust with an equal third of the assessment. The trustee
for this trust then sued the two children for the difference between the
equal third and the amount actually assessed. At the time of this case,
inheritance taxes constituted up to an eighty per cent credit against the
entire federal estate tax. The two children contended that they contrib-
uted more to the satisfaction of the federal tax by virtue of their being
assessed a greater proportion of the state inheritance tax used to offset the
federal levy and thus were entitled to contribution from the grandchil-
dren for having paid a larger share. The court, by its disallowment of this
contention, gave credence to the "no apportionment" view by saying:
It is sufficient to observe, however, that this State has no provision in its laws
relating to the incidence of the burden of Federal estate tax and it must
52284 111. 450, 120 N.E.286 (1918). 55 327 IMI. 547, 158 N.E. 861 (1927).
531d. at 454, 120 N.E. at 288. 5 6 Supra notes 21 and 22.
54 289 Iil. 475, 124 N.E. 662 (1919). 5 383 I1. 489, 50 N.E.2d 461 (1943).
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therefore fall directly upon the corpus of the estate and be considered an
item of expense, such as debts, funeral expenses, and the like. The fact that
inheritance taxes are allowed as a credit on Federal estate taxes, does not alter
the situation with respect to the nature and effect of the two cases. In the
absence of statutory enactment directing otherwise, the Federal tax must be
considered as a charge against the whole of the estate and not against the
individual shares, . . . unless otherwise directed by the testator.58
Although earlier Illinois cases 9 have been cited and considered collat-
erally as lending authority to the acceptance of the "burden on the resi-
due" rule in Illinois, it is essentially the language of the Hart case around
which modern Illinois case law has revolved. These cases include: People
v. Luehrs, 0 In re Ginsberg's Estate,61 Franz v. Schneider, 2 Lawless v.
Lawless,63 and Jinnette v. Guest.64 In the Lawless case, the court was
called upon to decide an action brought by an executor to recover from
certain devisees, an equitable proportionate share of the federal estate tax
attributable to the inclusion of their interests in real property in the tax-
able estate. In denying apportionment of the tax, the court asserted its
prior holdings that the federal estate tax was a charge of administration
and an item of the estate's expense, such as debts and funeral expenses,
and concluded:
The amount to be paid or any inequity between the heirs does not change the
law. Our courts have in certain cases invoked the doctrine of equitable contri-
bution, but no case has been cited that would affect the situation here.6 5
It would therefore appear that the ultimate federal estate tax burden is
placed upon the residuary of the estate in Illinois, and that the apportion-
ment doctrine, in total or only in regard to non-probate assets, is not
given recognition.
However, once the relevancy of these cases to the issue of apportionment
is considered, the applicable doctrine appears to be in question. The early
decisions 6 and the holding in the Luebrs case 7 were concerned only with
the problem of computing the net estate for state inheritance tax purposes
and not with apportionment between beneficiaries of the estate. These
cases merely decided a method of tax computation and not placement of
the ultimate tax burden.
58 Id. at 497, 50 N.E.2d at 464-5. 59 Supra notes 52, 54 and 55.
60408 111. 383, 97 N.E. 2d 307 (1951).
614 Ill. App. 2d 138, 123 N.E. 2d 739 (1955).
62 14 Ill. App. 2d 464, 144 N.E.2d 798 (1957).
60 17 Ill. App. 2d 481, 150 N.E.2d 646 (1958).
64 35 Il1. App. 2d 434, 183 N.E.2d 194 (1962).
65 Supra note 63 at 492, 150 N.E.2d at 651.
66 Supra notes 52, 54 and 55. 67 Supra note 60.
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The Hart case, on the other hand, which furnishes the most authorita-
tive language regarding non-apportionment, loses some of its forcefulness
when it is recognized that its holding in regard to the federal estate
tax, while germane, was not necessary to the determination of the prin-
cipal issue, for the court had been called upon only to determine appor-
tionment of the state inheritance tax. Although Hart was decided after
the Del Drago case and thus recognized the right of the state to determine
location of the federal tax burden, it involved appointive trust assets with
the powers being exercised in 1933. This was before the 1942 enactment
of Sec. 403 (a) of the Revenue Act.6 8 Therefore, the non-apportionment
of appointive assets, implied by Hart, would have no effect today. Fur-
thermore, some authorities contend that the proper interpretation of the
language used in the Hart case shows that the court had in mind the view
that the federal estate tax was a levy against the whole of the decedent's
taxable estate and was not solely a burden on the residue of the probate
estate. 69 Support for this proposition is based on the close similarity of
language between the Hart and Del Drago cases. In Hart, the Illinois
Supreme Court said that, "the Federal tax must be considered as a charge
against the whole of the estate ... ,70, and, in Del Drago the United States
Supreme Court stated that, "the Federal estate tax should be paid out of the
estate as a whole." 71 A distinction must necessarily be made between the
taxable estate of a decedent and the probate estate under the law of wills
in order to interpret the language of these cases.72
Other Illinois cases which hold in favor of the "burden on the residue"
rule are merely extensions of the Hart decision. The Ginsberg case"
involved a tax dispute concerning apportionment between tax exempt and
non-tax exempt beneficiaries of federal income tax, and not estate tax. In
Franz v. Schneider74 the no apportionment holding was dictum and only
collateral to the issue of state inheritance tax apportionment. The ref-
erences therein to the Hart case were employed only to negate a legatee's
contention concerning construction of a will provision. Lawless v. Law-
less,75 although an action to recover equitable contribution by means of
apportionment, was primarily concerned with apportionment as applied
to personal property and to real property bequeathed and devised under
a will, and not with apportionment between the residue and other interests
68 Supra note 19.
69 Lauritzen, Apportionment of Federal Estate Tax, I TAx CouNs. Q. 55, 81-83 (June
1957).
70 Supra note 57 at 497, 50 N.E. 2d at 465.
71 Supra note 30 at 97.
72 Supra note 69. 74 Supra note 62.
78 Supra note 61. 75 Supra note 63.
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included in the taxable estate. The court held that the personal estate must
be exhausted before realty can be charged with the payment of debts and
costs of administration, but cited the Hart decision in reaching its con-
clusion. Lawless did imply however, that under certain circumstances the
court could invoke equitable contribution. 76 Finally, in jinnette v. Guest,7 7
a will provision directing apportionment against the recipients of a spe-
cific bequest of corporation stock was ruled ineffective on the grounds
that the recipients' rights to the stock arose out of a prior agreement which
had precluded the imposition of any charge or encumbrance. Nevertheless,
the court again made needless mention of the Hart decision when it said:
In 1937, at the time the agreement was made, as today, the federal estate tax
was treated in Illinois as a claim or expense of administration, payable out
of the residuary estate and not a charge against individual legatees unless other-
wise specifically directed by the testator. 78
Lip service of Illinois' apportionment position has also been made in
the federal court. The United States Supreme Court in Harrison v. North-
ern Trust Company,79 decided in the same year as the Hart case, and
which also affirmed the Del Drago decision, made note of non-apportion-
ment in Illinois when it stated: "while the estate tax may be a charge
against the entire estate under Illinois law, admittedly its payment will
operate to reduce the amount of the residuary estate."80 But this case did
not involve the question of apportionment of the federal estate tax, but
rather, concerned itself solely with the interpretation of a federal tax
statute. The federal court has also entertained the apportionment problem
where estate assets were situated in several states, each having a different
view regarding apportionment. The case of Doetch v. Doetchs' involved
such a conflict of law problem. Non-probate trust assets were located in
Illinois, and the decedent was domiciled in Arizona. The United States
Court of Appeals had to determine whether Illinois would apply its own
law as situs of the trust, to determine an apportionment of the estate tax,
or whether it would apply the law of the decedent's domicile. There were
no Illinois cases in point, but the court determined that the laws of the
situs of the domicile would prevail. It was stated:
When questions of apportionment of estate taxes arise in courts of a state
of the situs of a trust whose assets are includible in decedent's gross estate
for tax purposes, the law of the situs refers to the law of decedent's domicile
to resolve the question.82
76 d. at 492, 150 N.E.2d at 651.
77 Supra note 64. Bo Id. at 480.
78 ld. at 440, 183 N.E. 2d at 197. 81312 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1963).
79 317 U.S. 476 (1942). 82 Id. at 328.
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The court therefore did not find it necessary to determine the law of
Illinois in respect to placement of the ultimate tax burden. But in applying
Arizona law the court found that there was neither a statute on apportion-
ment nor a judicial pronouncement on the subject. The court was of the
opinion that Arizona would adopt the rule of apportionment and so
applied it to the case.
One example of the circumstances under which the Illinois courts have
allowed apportionment by way of equitable contribution is found in the
case of Northern Trust Company v. Wilson,83 where the widow of the
decedent renounced the will and sought to take her statutory share free
from the estate tax burden rather than after payment of the tax. The court
held that the widow would have to take her share subject to the tax.
Commenting upon this case, one authority has stated that, "as would have
been expected, by a court following the principles of equitable apportion-
ment, the Illinois court held that the widow should take her share after
the payment of federal estate taxes. '84
Summarizing the apportionment position of Illinois, it can be stated that
generally the ultimate burden for payment of the federal estate tax is to
be placed upon the residuary estate except where the Internal Revenue
Code specifically provides to the contrary, and subject to the directives
of a testator. This rule has been predicated upon judicial determination
and not statutory enactment, and is based on stare decisis consisting of
cases involving a misunderstanding of the federal estate tax statute appli-
cation, and unnecessary application of the rule. No clear cut federal estate
tax apportionment problem has yet been presented to the Illinois courts
involving probate and non-probate assets, and it is probable that none will
be, because in view of the language used by the Illinois Supreme Court in
the Hart decision and the many citations thereto in the Appellate Court,
most testators, whose estates will be subject to the estate tax imposition,
will include a tax clause in their will specifically attempting to locate the
ultimate tax burden. These estates, upon probate, will then involve liti-
gation of the construction of the tax provision.85
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of apportionment is primarily intended to remedy possible
inequities and to promote justice. It acts to prevent inequality and unjust
enrichment and is founded upon the principles of equitable contribution.
Since Illinois has not applied this doctrine by judicial pronouncement, the
1967 State Legislature should give careful consideration to the enactment
of either a total apportionment statute or at least one applicable to non-
88 344 Il. App. 508, 101 N.E. 2d 604 (1951).
84 Lauritzen, supra note 69, at 81. 85 Supra note 11.
